SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : ATMOSPHERIC REVIT. FMEA NO 06-1B -0561 -3 REV: 08/19/E ASSEMBLY :WATER COOLANT LOOPS CRIT. FUNC: P/N RI :V070-613XXX CRIT. HDW: P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104 :51 QUANTITY

PER SUBSYSTEM EFFECTIVITY: X X X X PHASE(S): PL LO X OO X DO X LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PAS APPROVED BY (MASA) PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: KLOES THE DES N. K. DUONG SSM N. L. STEISSLINGER REL L 64500E REL QE D. STOICA QE QE

ITEM:

COLDPLATES

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES HEAT DISSIPATION OF AVIONICS BAY EQUIPMENT BY MEANS OF CONDUCTION TO THE WATER COOLANT LOOPS. FORTY-NINE COLDPLATES PER SET. COLDPLATE P/N QUANTITY EQUIPMENT COOLED V070-613207 2 RJDF'S V070-613208 3 PWR CONT ASSY'S V070-613210 1 GCILU V070-613211 1 COMSEC'S V070-613212 1 CCUA, EVLSS, P/L DATA INTLVR V070-613213 2 S-BAND XPNDR'S, N/W S/P'S V070-613214 2 P/L INTERR'S, P/L SIG PROC'S ~ V070-613215 1 MCA 3, EVA/ATC XCVR V070-613220 FM XMT'S V070-613226 KU BAND EA-1A & EA-2A, HUD'S V070-613228 KU BAND SP V070-613231 S/B PRE AMP, S/B PWR AMP V070-613232 3 MSS PCM RCRDR, OP RCDR'S V070-613233 3 INVERTERS V070-613234 2 PCM MSTR'S V070-613237 3 INVERTERS V070-613241 MIU V070-613242 3 LOAD CONT ASSY'S V070-613243 3 MDM & SIG COND'S V070-613371 MDM'S V070-613373 2 MASS MEM'S V070-613374 2 RAD ALT & MDM'S V070-613596 TEXT GRAPHICS V070-613597 · GPS 4 V070-613598 GPS 3

TWO ADDITIONAL COLDPLATES PROVIDE HEAT DISSIPATION FOR MDM OF4 (FLIGHT DECK) AND FLOODLIGHT (PAYLOAD BAY); P/N'S V070-613010, V070-613180.

FAILURE MODE:

INTERLOOP LEAKAGE

CAUSE(S):

MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION

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EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) TRANSFER OF COOLANT FROM ONE WATER LOOP TO THE OTHER UNTIL PRESSURE IN BOTH LOOPS IS EQUALIZED.
- (B) NO EFFECT.
- (C) POSSIBLE EARLY MISSION TERMINATION FOR FIRST FAILURE.
- (D) SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE (LEAKAGE OF ONE WATER COOLANT LOOP) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL CABIN COOLING AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) PAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN

COLDPLATES ARE CONSTRUCTED OF TWO TYPE 347 CRES FACE SHEETS (LOOP 1 SID 0.012 IN THICK AND LOOP 2 SIDE 0.016 IN THICK) BRAZED TO A CORE & 113 I THICK. THE COLDPLATE CORE HAS PIN FINS ON BOTH SIDES AND BAFFLES TO MA UP FLOW PATHS FOR WCL 1 & 2. PIN FINS ARE 0.048 INCH IN DIAMETER AND 0.047 IN HIGH, AND ARE ARRANGED IN A STAGGERED EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE FORMATION WITH A PITCH DISTANCE OF 0.190 IN. THERE ARE NICKEL PLATED PADS AROUND PORTS, AND ETHYLENE PROPYLENE RUBBER (EPR) 0-RING SEALS AT MANIFOLDS. THERE ARE NO MOVING PARTS. WATER COOLANT LOOPS CONTAIN 10 MICRON HIGH HOLDING CAPACITY SYSTEM FILTER AT THE PUMP PACKAGE INLET AN 61 MICRON FILTERS AT PUMP INLET AND OUTLET. COOLANT IS HIGH PURITY/LOW OXYGEN CONTENT WATER. MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WITH WATER AND ALCOHOL BASED ON MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION ANALYSIS (REF CAR 01A-22-610001-FCF-A).

(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TEST - COLDPLATES CERTIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO APOLLO COLDPLATES (VIBRATION, SHOCK, AND ACCELERATION). COLDPLATES WERE SUBJECTED TO PRESSURE CYCLING, BURST PRESSURE, FLOW VS PRESSURE DROP ANTHERMAL PERFORMANCE TESTS.

ACCEPTANCE TEST - FLOW AND DELTA-P ARE VERIFIED. COLDPLATES ARE ULTRASONICALLY CLEANED, FLUSHED WITH WATER AND FREON TF, VERIFIED TO LEVEL 300 CLEANLINESS AND DRIED PRIOR TO STORAGE.

IN-VEHICLE TESTING - SYSTEM LEAK TEST IS PERFORMED AT 85 - 95 PSIG, 8 CC/MIN MAX LEAKAGE. LOOPS ARE SERVICED WITH A DELTA OF APPROXIMATELY 18 BETWEEN THEIR ACCUMULATOR QUANTITIES TO ENABLE DETECTION OF INTERLOOP LEAKAGE.

OMRSD - LOOPS ARE SERVICED WITH A DELTA OF APPROXIMATELY 10% BETWEEN THEIR ACCUMULATOR QUANTITIES TO ENABLE DETECTION OF INTERLOOP LEAKAGE. PUMP OUT PRESSURE AND ACCUMULATOR QUANTITY ARE MONITORED CONTINUOUSLY WHEN THE VEHICLE IS POWERED UP DURING EACH TURNAROUND. WATER IS SAMPLED PER SPEC SE-S-0073 DURING SERVICING.

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(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION MATERIAL ISSUED FOR FABRICATION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION ON MANUFACTURING ORDERS (CHECK MATERIAL FOR SCRATCHES).

CONTAMINATION CONTROL CLEANLINESS LEVEL 300 IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION MACHINE TOLERANCES AND DETAIL PARTS ARE PER DRAWING, AND ARE VERIFIED E INSPECTION. SEALING SURFACES PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES COLDPLATES ARE BRAZED PER DRAWING, AND ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ELECTRO-DEPOSIT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING . PROOF PRESSURE AND LEAK CHECK ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ATP IS ÷

HANDLING/PACKAGING HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

- (D) FAILURE HISTORY NO FAILURE HISTORY APPLICABLE TO INTERLOOP LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. THE COLDPLATES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED WITHOUT FAILURE THROUGH THE DURATION OF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE TBS.

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